The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group is a community of nuclear forensic practitioners who respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The Group is dedicated to advancing nuclear forensic science in part through periodic participation in materials exercises. The Group completed its fourth Collaborative Materials Exercise in 2015 in which laboratories from 15 countries and one multinational organization analyzed three samples of special nuclear material in support of a mock nuclear forensic investigation. This special section of the Journal for Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry is devoted to summarizing highlights from this exercise.
Introduction
Over the past decade, nuclear forensic science has gained increase prominence as a nuclear security tool. The Nuclear Security Summit [1] , Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism [2] , and International Atomic Energy Agency [3] all have efforts to strengthen nuclear forensics. There is good reason for the increased attention to nuclear security. Terrorists could use nuclear or other radioactive materials that continue to be found outside regulatory control to cause harm. Governments have several tools to investigate and prosecute illegal uses of nuclear and other radioactive material; nuclear forensic science helps them identify linkages among illegally used materials, people, places and events.
The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was established more than two decades ago following seizures of smuggled weapon-usable nuclear material in several European cities in the early 1990s. ITWG is a community of nuclear forensic practitioners that seeks to identify and socialize best practices in the field of nuclear forensic science. It includes scientists, law enforcement officials, regulators and policy makers committed to combatting trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and is open to all states, organizations and individuals that are recognized by competent national or international authorities with an interest in technical nuclear forensics [4] . Since 2007, representatives from approximately 50 countries and multinational organizations have participated in ITWG annual meetings (individual countries participating in ITWG annual meetings are highlighted in the map in Fig. 1 ) [5] .
Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs) are one of the primary ways ITWG works to identify and socialize best practices in the field of nuclear forensics. Since the first CMX in 1999, a total of 25 countries and the European Commission have participated in ITWG materials exercises in which special nuclear materials are distributed to participating labs for nuclear forensic analysis [6] [7] [8] . The country flags in Fig. 1 show which laboratories have participated in at least one CMX. The CMX series is designed to be a learning experience, not a performance test. The exercises target questions that scientists are likely to be asked by investigators and prosecutors, e.g. is it dangerous, radioactive or illegal to possess; how was the material produced; where and when did it escape regulatory control; what was the route from the point of loss of control to where it was seized by authorities; can it be linked to other materials, persons, places or things; etc.
The ITWG completed its fourth, and at the time largest, CMX in 2015 with participating laboratories from 15 countries and one multinational organization. A list of laboratories participating in CMX-4 are provided in Table 1 . Each of these laboratories received three small samples of special nuclear material as part of a mock forensics analysis supporting a nuclear smuggling investigation/prosecution.
Exercise design
While the outcomes from every CMX always seem to generate unexpected and often at times surprising results, each exercise is developed to target a particular aspect of a [6] [7] [8] . The selection of this class of material was designed to not only continue to evaluate ''gold standard'' techniques for nuclear forensics like mass spectrometry, but also test the viability of rapid, non-destructive assay techniques like high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS) on this class of material since it is known that uranium isotopic analysis by HRGS becomes more challenging with decreasing enrichment levels of 235 U. While bulk isotopic analyses are an integral part of every nuclear forensics investigation, another goal of CMX-4 was to encourage the measurement of material characteristics other than isotopic abundances for use in a nuclear forensic investigation. Design features of CMX-4 targeted the measurement of material characteristics including, but not limited to, trace element content, major and minor solid phase composition, and material morphology or microstructure to support group inclusion/exclusion decisions during the mock nuclear forensic investigation. This was done by choosing a set of three exercise samples (ESs) in which two of the three samples had: (a) similar chemical makeup, but different isotopic composition, (b) different chemical makeup, with similar isotopic composition, and (c) different chemical makeup and isotopic composition and then driving a scenario that encouraged laboratories to identify these differences.
Scenario
The fictional CMX-4 Scenario was as follows:
On a tip from a confidential informant (CI), a passenger scheduled to fly out of Dallas International Airport to Frankfurt, Germany has been stopped by the authorities at the airport for alleged ''simple possession'' of a radioactive substance without proper documentation. The authorities have seized a small, flexible plastic container (commonly referred to as a ''baggie'') containing a black powdery radioactive substance alleged by the CI to contain uranium. In a separate search of the subject's residence, authorities located and took into evidence a dense radioactive object, suspected to be a nuclear fuel pellet, such as one that would be used for nuclear power generation. Law enforcement working this investigation are cooperating with German authorities who had seized similar pellets at an abandoned warehouse outside of Frankfurt two years prior.
Exercise participants were asked to analyze a total of three samples, designated as exercise sample (ES) 1-3. The first two samples (ES-1 and ES-2) said to be seized in Texas at the airport (ES-1) and later during a search of the suspect's residence (ES-2) were analyzed to support law enforcement's decision of whether any relevant law has been violated by the suspect. A third sample (ES-3) from the German seizure was also provided to laboratories for analysis. Laboratories were asked to compare and contrast material characteristics of all three samples to assist authorities in determining if the two samples taken from the suspect and his home had the same or similar origin and if either of these samples had any connection between the previous event in Germany [9] .
Exercise materials
Two sources of uranium oxide pellets (A and B) were used to create the three ESs (ES-1-3) used during CMX-4. These source materials were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and consisted of high fired, LEU oxide (UO 2 ) pellets of slightly different enrichments of the isotope 235 U. These pellets were originally designed to be used as targets in the high flux Australian reactor (HIFAR) in the production of medical radioisotopes. They were originally produced by AREVA (FBFC, Framatome ANP) for ANSTO but were never used prior to retiring the HIFAR in 2007.
Uranium that was used to produce pellets from Source A were enriched on 12 February 2002, while pellets from Source B were sourced from a single batch enriched sometime in 2004 (the exact date was unknown to the exercise facilitators). Sources A and B consisted of 90 pellets each, available in two different enrichments relative to the weight percent of the isotope 235 U-2.19 and 2.9%, respectively.
Samples were prepared, characterized and packaged at ANSTO, with the help of a staff person from DOE's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and sent to the US DOE's Y-12 National Security Complex and (in one instance) PNNL for distribution to each participating laboratory.
Samples were selected and prepared carefully to facilitate a variety of comparisons through nuclear forensic analysis. ESs used during CMX-4 included three samples of LEU oxide produced from the same enrichment and fabrication facilities but within two different batches generated several years apart. Two of the three samples shared bulk chemical form (ES-2 and ES-3) but had different microstructural properties. Two of the three samples (ES-1 and ES-3) came from the same batch of material, but had different chemical forms, but shared some microstructural features. In this case, ES-1 was chemically altered through crushing, heating, and partial oxidation of ES-3 pellets. The preparation method of ES-1 made it possible for laboratories to identify trace remnants of the original phase (UO 2 ) and microstructural features within a majority of a new phase (U 3 O 8 ) to provide circumstantial evidence connecting the two samples. The preparation of each of these samples is described below.
Preparation of ES-1
ES-1 was made up of Source B that had been crushed to a powder and partially converted with heat to a higher oxide form. Specifically, pellets from Source B (taken from the same batch used to generate ES-3) was milled in a large ball mill for 2 min. The powder from this process was then be heated to 325°C at a ramp rate of 10°C/min. This temperature was held constant at 325°C for 1.5 h.
Preparation of ES-2
ES-2 consisted of a single, unadulterated, pellet taken from a single batch within Source A. The surface of each pellet was wiped clean prior to packaging for shipment.
Preparation of ES-3
ES-3 consisted of a single, unadulterated, uranium pellet taken from a single batch within Source B. The surface of each pellet was wiped clean prior to packaging for shipment.
Highlights from JRNC special section on CMX-4
Within this special section, the reader will find major outcomes from CMX-4 contained within one of seven technical articles organized by technical area [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , and one additional article briefly describing the experiences of seven of the laboratories participating in the CMX series of exercises for the first time [17] . The latter chronicles the challenges these newcomers faced, from the receipt and handling of special nuclear materials, to the timely analysis and reporting of results under operational timelines-all made possible by transforming often ''general use'' radioanalytical laboratories to execute analytical plans and quality assurance/quality control processes of a sufficient rigor for a court of law.
The technical articles included in this special section are:
• ''Physical characterisation of uranium oxide pellets and Griffiths et al. [10] highlights the usefulness of macroand micro-structural characterization during a nuclear forensics investigation. Optical microscopy and profilometry were macro-scale techniques utilized to capture surface features/tool marks on the fuel pellets for purposes of group inclusion/exclusion evaluations. These measurements suggested that both pellets were subjected to similar handling processes following their compaction, pressing and sintering, leading one to conclude (correctly) they were likely produced at the same facility. Microstructural differences between the two samples as observed by electron microscopy, however, suggested (correctly) these two pellets were from separate production batches.
During a forensic investigation, often the most useful information collected by investigators is also the most basic information. Basic information about the major chemical phases contained within the ESs provided clues to the process history of those materials. Holmgren Rondahl et al. [11] showed that most of the laboratories participating in CMX-4 could successfully apply the ''gold standard'' X-ray diffraction (XRD) technique to identify major phases in unknown radioactive materials. Additionally, a number of labs attempted to apply emerging technologies [18] like quantitative XRD, neutron diffraction and more sensitive but less well understood techniques such as micro-Raman and -infrared spectroscopies to investigate the chemical makeup of unknown nuclear materials.
Timely analyses within the first 24 h in a nuclear forensics investigation can provide important information about the potential hazards of an investigation site facing first responders, law enforcement and the public, investigative leads, and even support decisions about whether the incident should be considered a criminal investigation. Within this timeframe no analytical tool is more valuable to nuclear forensic scientists than HRGS. Demonstrated by all participants during CMX-4 within the first 24 h of the exercise (as summarized by Lakosi et al. [12] ), this rapid and relatively accurate isotopic analysis technique has been a mainstay for the ITWG Network of Forensics Laboratories in every CMX conducted thus far [6] [7] [8] 18] . Measuring isotopic abundance of special nuclear materials using HRGS is an advanced skill requiring participants to estimate detection efficiency as a function of gamma energy using commercial or in-house modeling software. During CMX-4, both in-house and one of four commercial software programs were demonstrated with similar outcomes. HRGS provided the first evidence that ES-1 and ES-3 had undergone chemical reprocessing while ES-2 had not, supporting insights to the process history of these samples and a scientific basis for group inclusion/exclusion decisions.
In most instances, HRGS is sufficiently accurate and capable of identifying unknown radioactive materials during a nuclear forensics investigation. However, more advanced, precise, accurate, expensive and tedious mass spectrometric techniques are often needed in instances where two or more nuclear materials are being compared and contrasted to each other for the purposes of group inclusion/exclusion to establish or reject connections between people, places, events and things. Kuchkin et al. [13] summarizes several bulk mass spectrometric techniques that were applied by the exercise participants within 1-weeks' time during CMX-4. With few exceptions, these techniques have been shown [18] to provide more accurate and precise measurements with lower overall associated uncertainties of most longer-lived actinide isotopes than radiometric techniques like alpha spectrometry and HRGS.
Radiochronometry, or the estimation of process age by the exploitation of radioactive parent and daughter abundances in materials, is a specific application of the measurement of isotopic abundances by nuclear counting methods, mass spectrometric methods, or a combination of both. Kristo et al. [14] summarizes a total of 12 results of radiochronometry in an attempt to estimate the process age of the exercise materials used during CMX-4 from a total of 10 labs using a combination of alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry. These results, which exploited one of three independent parent/daughter isotope ratios, were found to be generally consistent with each other and also consistent with the known process age of the material.
Additionally, concordance between process age estimated by multiple independent parent/daughter relationships provided confirmation that the assumptions required by radiochronometry were valid for these samples.
Attempts to utilize HRGS results for radiochronometric applications during CMX-4 were reported in [12] . While radiochronometry using HRGS has been demonstrated with exercise materials enriched in 235 U to greater than 90% [8] in the past, similar attempts to calculate process age during CMX-4 were unsuccessful due to the nature of the material (LEU). Simply put, an insufficient number of daughter product atoms were generated from in-growth of the parent from the time of last separation to the time of measurement to be detectable by this approach. One participating laboratory estimated the minimum time needed for in-growth of the daughter products for LEU of this level of enrichment to support radiochronometric analysis by HRGS to be roughly 11 years.
Emerging applications in nuclear forensic science have focused on the use of analyses other than isotopic measurements that can be used to support these types of investigations. Bulk and surface trace element analyses fall into this category and were demonstrated by a number of laboratories during CMX-4, as summarized by Nelwamondo et al. [15] . The most basic application of trace element content can provide investigators materials characteristics that can be used to establish or reject connections between two unknown samples while future endeavours may someday allow nuclear forensic scientists to use this information to identify the process history, or even the facility the material originated from.
For the first time during a CMX, secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) was employed by three separate laboratories to measure isotopic inventories of U on individual particles. Their efforts are summarized in Stebelkov et al. [16] . Results from these advanced analyses provided the most definitive evidence for correctly identifying or refuting connections between ESs and highlighted an important and emerging technology in nuclear forensic science. Particle isotopic analyses provided information about the process history of the three exercise materials, in which identical ''enrichment lines'' were measured for each of the three samples, suggesting (correctly) that all samples were enriched within the same enrichment cascade.
Importance of ITWG and its CMXs to global nuclear security
Nuclear forensics plays a vital role in global nuclear security, addressing issues that transcend country and regional borders. The success of nuclear forensic science therefore depends upon strong global partnerships. No other community better exemplifies this than the international network of scientists, regulators, law enforcement, and policy makers participating in the ITWG, practitioners in the field of nuclear forensics who are dedicated to combatting the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.
Exercises like CMX-4 strengthen nuclear forensic science and global nuclear security by providing a forum for demonstrating, sharing, and adopting the best practices in the nuclear forensics field.
